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I. INTRODUCTION

Three white men in rural Saskatchewan pick up a twelve-year-old
aboriginal girl. After giving her four drinks, all three men attempt to
have intercourse with her. Only one of the men is convicted of sexual
assault and he is given a two-year sentence to be served in the
community. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upholds both the
conviction and the sentence. 1 In Calgary, a homeless and drug-addicted
woman blacks out, awakening in an inner city park to find a man beating
and raping her. She yells “I’m being raped” and is heard by a passerby.
The man is acquitted. 2 In inner city Edmonton, a passing driver notices
an unconscious woman on the sidewalk. Two men are in the process of
∗ Associate Professor, Women’s Studies, University of Alberta, Canada. Email:
lise.gotell@ualberta.ca. I am grateful to colleagues involved in the LSA Berlin 2007 panel “The
Epistemology of Consent in Rape Law,” where the ideas developed in this article were first
presented. Emma Cunliffe, the discussant on this panel, provided invaluable comments on the
Berlin paper. I am also grateful to Jane Campbell Moriarty for the invitation to contribute to this
important symposium issue.
1. R. v. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270 (Sask. C.A. 2005).
2. R. v. M.S., [2003] A.J. No. 1516, (Alta. Prov. Ct. Nov. 27, 2003).
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fondling her breasts. The men are first convicted of sexual assault, and
then acquitted on summary appeal. 3 The Alberta Court of Appeal later
restores the initial convictions. 4
These cases deal with different questions within sexual assault law:
age of consent and the adequacy of a sentence; findings of fact and
questions of credibility; and the validity of the defense of prior consent
when a victim loses consciousness. While I offer insights on these
issues, my intent is not to analyze the status of Canadian doctrine in any
single area. Instead, I use these cases to critically interrogate new
standards for consent and the construction of victims who occupy and
inhabit spaces of risk.
To further provide a foundation for this analysis, I first trace the
development of an affirmative consent standard in Canadian law. While
the struggle for affirmative consent is typically framed as a feminist law
reform project, 5 I contend that we need to understand the legal
elaboration of a positive and explicit consent standard in relation to
wider shifts in governance. The second section of this article explores
how the legal elaboration of affirmative consent in Canadian law might
be seen as a specific expression of neoliberal governmentality, forging
new normative sexual subjects who interact within a transactional sexual
economy.
In section three, I demonstrate how discourses of
responsibilization and risk management inform recent Canadian sexual
assault decisions, constituting the ideal victim as the rape-preventing
subject who exercises appropriate caution (yet fails) and the normative
masculine sexual subject as he who avoids the risk of criminalization
through securing consent. Just as new consent norms prescribe
privileged sexual subjectivities and new conceptions of good/credible
victims, so too do they produce new mechanisms for discrediting claims
of sexual assault. In the final section of this article, I interrogate the
reconstruction of the good victim/bad complainant dichotomy in
Canadian judicial discourses. As I suggest, the opposite of the rape-

3. R. v. Ashlee, [2005] A.J. No. 1952, (ABQB June 9, 2005).
4. R. v. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, (Alta. C.A. Aug. 23, 2006).
5. See, for example, Dan Subotnik’s critique where he characterizes affirmative consent as a
feminist imposition on criminal law. Dan Subotnik, “Hands Off”: Sex, Feminism, Affirmative
Consent, and the Law of Foreplay, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 249, 293-97 (2007). Those
who build a reform case for affirmative consent from a specifically feminist stance include, but are
not limited to: Lois Pineau, A Response to My Critics, in DATE RAPE 63, 63 (Leslie Francis ed.,
Pennsylvania State University Press 1996); Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and
Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L. & GEN. 381, 437-39 (2005); Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1421 (2005); Katherine K. Baker, Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law,
28 HARV. J.L. & GEN. 447, 453-54 (2005).
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preventing subject is the “risky woman” who avoids personal
responsibility for sexual safety and who “chooses” to engage in a “highrisk lifestyle.” The sharp descent into the space of risk is a feature in
cases involving aboriginal women, women with addictions, and
homeless women. By considering three illustrative cases in some depth,
I demonstrate how such “risky women” appear to surrender their status
as legal subjects capable of having their refusals recognized in law.
Under the shadow of affirmative consent, standards of good victimhood
are currently being revised. Now less tied to chastity and sexual
propriety, constructions of good/credible victims are nonetheless built
upon exclusions that draw upon persistent race and class-based
ideologies, reconstructing vulnerability as responsibility.
II. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT IN CANADIAN LAW
Canadian law regarding nonconsensual sexual interaction has
changed dramatically in the past several years, mostly due to statutory
amendments and to changes in the common law. In 1992, after the
Supreme Court of Canada struck down restrictions on sexual history
evidence as a violation of constitutional legal rights, 6 Parliament reenacted a weakened form of “rape shield provisions” that complied with
the Court’s insistence on scope for judicial discretion. 7 Largely due to
feminist lobbying, 8 this reform initiative also clarified the law of consent
in a manner intended to reduce the possible uses of sexual history
evidence. For the first time, a statutory definition of consent as a
voluntary agreement was embedded in the Criminal Code. 9 The Code

6. R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (Can.).
7. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), 1992 S.C., ch. 38 (Can.); Criminal
Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 (1985) [hereinafter CC]. The admission of sexual history evidence solely to
show that the complainant was more likely to have consented or is less worthy of belief was
prohibited. Id. S. 276 requires that, to be admitted, evidence must be relevant to an issue at trial,
and that it must have significant probative value that is not “substantially outweighed by the danger
of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.” Id. In determining relevance and probative
value, the judge must consider such factors as the right to make full answer and defense, society's
interest in reporting, the importance of eliminating any discriminatory beliefs from the fact finding
process, the risk that the evidence will arouse prejudice, the prejudice to the complainant's privacy
and dignity, and the right to personal security and protection of the law. Id.
8. A broad-based consultation with feminist anti-violence activists preceded the 1992 sexual
assault law reform. For discussion of the consultations that shaped this reform, see Sheila McIntyre,
Redefining Reformism: The Consultations that Shaped C-49, in CONFRONTING SEXUAL ASSAULT: A
DECADE OF SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHANGE 293, 293-310 (Julian Robers & Renate Mohr eds.,
University of Toronto Press 1994).
9. Consent is defined as “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual
activity in question.” CC § 273(1)(2). It is also important to note that there is no longer a crime of
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enumerated situations of forced submission that do not constitute
consent (including when agreement is expressed by another person,
when the complainant is “incapable of consenting,” when the accused
abuses a position of power, trust, or authority, and when the complainant
expresses a lack of agreement to engage or continue to engage in the
sexual activity). 10 Finally, the defense of mistaken belief was limited by
a new requirement that the accused must have taken “reasonable steps”
to ensure consent and by specifying that there can be no such defense
when this belief arises through “recklessness” or “willful blindness.” 11
By distinguishing consent from forced submission, this revised statutory
language gestured towards a contextual analysis of the power relations
within which sexual interactions unfold. The positive definition of
consent as a voluntary agreement, as well as limitations on the defense
of mistaken belief, challenged a version of normative heterosexuality
founded on feminine acquiescence to seduction, moving Canadian law
towards an affirmative consent standard.
R. v. Ewanchuk 12 has become the leading authority for trial and
appellate judges as they attempt to apply these revised statutory
provisions. In this important decision, the Supreme Court of Canada
articulated a standard for sexual consent that approaches “only yes

rape in Canadian law. In 1983, Parliament replaced the rape provision with the current three-tier
structure of gender-neutral sexual assault offenses, criminalizing all forms of non-consensual sexual
touching and no longer specifically designating an offense defined by penetration. The existing
sexual assault provisions distinguish between varying degrees of violence used in commission of the
crime. Thus, there is a general sexual assault provision, as well as provisions relating to sexual
assault with a weapon, threats to a third party and causing bodily harm, and aggravated sexual
assault. CC §§ 271(1), 272(1), and 273, respectively.
10. CC § 273.1 (3) provides that:
[n]o consent is obtained, for the purposes of [this section], where (a) the agreement is
expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the complainant; (b) the
complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity; (c) the accused induces the
complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority;
(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the
activity; or (e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses,
by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity.
Id.
11. CC § 273.2 provides that:
[i]t is not a defence . . . that the accused believed that the complainant consented
…where (a) the accused's belief arose from the accused's: (i) self-induced intoxication,
or (ii) recklessness or wilful blindness; or (b) the accused did not take reasonable steps,
in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant
was consenting.
Id.
12. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330.
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means yes.” 13 The Court unanimously found that there is no defense of
“implied consent” in Canadian law, defining the actus reus of sexual
assault as non-consensual sexual touching where consent is determined
from the subjective position of the complainant. 14 While insisting that
intent is a crucial element of the crime of sexual assault, the decision
emphasized that the defense of mistaken belief is not available when
tainted by recklessness or willful blindness. 15 Moreover, gesturing
towards the “reasonable steps” requirement, the Court emphasized that
triers of fact must consider whether the accused took active steps to both
establish and reestablish consent. 16 The Court also embraced a specific
consent standard, wherein clear agreement to continue to engage in
sexual contact must be obtained after someone has said no: “[t]he
accused cannot rely on the mere lapse of time or the complainant’s
silence or equivocal conduct to indicate that . . . consent now exists, nor
can he engage in further sexual touching to ‘test the waters.’” 17 Finally,
the Court conceptualized consent as positive consent, arguing that “the
mens rea of sexual assault is not only satisfied when it is shown that the
accused knew that the complainant was essentially saying “no,” but is
also satisfied when it is shown that the accused knew that the
complainant was essentially not saying “yes.” 18 In effect, Ewanchuk
stands for the proposition that silence and ambiguous conduct do not
constitute consent and it directs attention to defendants’ actions in
seeking agreement. 19
Decisions since Ewanchuk have continued to consolidate an
affirmative consent standard in Canadian law by giving teeth to the
requirements that consent must be active and can be withdrawn and
holding that consent-seeking must be comprised of positive steps to

13. Rakhi Ruparelia, Does No Mean “No” Mean Reasonable Doubt? Assessing the Impact of
Ewanchuk on Determinations of Consent, 25 CAN. WOMAN STUD. 167, 167 (2006); Lise Gotell,
The Discursive Disappearance of Sexualized Violence: Feminist Law Reform, Judicial Resistance
and Neo-liberal Sexual Citizenship, in REACTION AND RESISTANCE: FEMINISM, LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 127, 144-46 (Dorothy E. Chunn, Susan B. Boyd & Hester Lessard eds., University of
British Columbia Press 2007); Renu Mandhane, Efficiency or Autonomy? Economic and Feminist
Legal Theory in the Context of Sexual Assault 59 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 173, 188 (2001).
14. Ewanchuk, 1 S.C.R. 330 at ¶ 30-31, 34-35.
15. Id. at ¶ 42 & 52.
16. Id. at ¶ 58, 60. While the majority did not directly apply § 273.2, the concurring decision
by L'Heureux-Dubé J. stated that, "unless and until an accused first takes reasonable steps to assure
that there is consent, the defense of honest but mistaken belief does not arise" Id. at ¶ 99
(L’Heureux-Dube, concurring).
17. Id. at ¶ 52.
18. Id. at ¶ 45 (quoting R. v. Park, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 836, ¶ 39 (Can.)).
19. Ruparelia, supra note 13, at 171; Gotell, supra note 13; Mandhane, supra note 13.
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secure agreement. 20 Some rulings have emphasized that consent must
be “freely given” with awareness of the proposed actions and their
consequences, raising the definition of consent to a standard of
“informed consent.” 21 In a significant decision clarifying the defense of
mistaken belief, the Manitoba Court of Appeal determined that active
steps to secure agreement are required when circumstances exist that
would cause a “reasonable man to inquire further,” raising the mens rea
standard in Canadian law close to an objective standard. 22 Some
circumstances, such as entering a complainant’s bedroom while she was
sleeping after a night of drinking or knowing that she was married to a
close friend, the Court argued, require conversation and verbal consent,
rather than a mere reliance on physical responses. 23 And even in
situations where complainants are intoxicated, drug affected and/or
unconscious, Canadian courts are increasingly convicting, finding that
proceeding with sex in these situations constitutes recklessness or willful
blindness. 24 Clearly, cases involving intoxication continue to be
contentious as complainants are often unable to provide a complete
account of what happened. Yet, in some key decisions, judges have

20. For an analysis of reported post-Ewanchuk decisions 1999-2004, see Gotell, supra note
13, at 146-153.
21. R. v. Stender [2005] 1 S.C.R. 914; R. v. R.R., [2001] O.J. No. 4254, ¶ 44 (Ont. C.A. Nov.
5, 2001).
22. R. v. Malcolm, 148 Man. R. (2d) 143, ¶ 21 (Man. C.A. 2000). It is important to note that
the “reasonable steps” requirement modified the common law mens rea standard, shifting this
standard from what had been a purely subjective standard, towards a quasi-objective standard.
Thus, it is not required that belief in consent be “reasonable” (that is, assessed from the standpoint
of the reasonable person). Instead, the accused cannot present a defence that the accused believed
the complainant consented to the activity if “the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the
circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting.”
CC § 273.2(b). Despite this, some trial and appellate courts have begun to interpret this provision
as requiring a “reasonable” belief in consent. Some feminist commentators have been critical of
this interpretation. As Lucinda Vandervort has written for example,
I suggest that adoption of an “objective” standard to assess culpability would invite
dispositions that reflect community prejudices and practices. To use the very social
norms of sexual conduct that result in the commission of sexual offences to determine
whether an exculpatory defense is available, would, in the vast majority of cases, only
serve to approve those norms and the conduct based on them. That approach would
permit the effective legal norm to be determined by reference to the “ordinary” conduct
of the “ordinarily” sexually aggressive individual, rather than by a positive standard
pursuant to the rule of law.
Lucinda Vandervort, Honest Beliefs, Credible Lies, and Culpable Awareness: Rhetoric, Inequality,
and Mens Rea, 42 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 625, 659 (2004).
23. Malcolm, 148 Man. R. (2d) 143, at ¶ 36; see also R. v. Cornejo, 68 O.R. (3d) 117 (Ont.
C.A. 2003); R. v. Rodas, [1999] O.J. No. 4503 QUICKLAW (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. Oct. 27, 1999)
(Rodas).
24. R. v. J.A., [2003] O.J. No. 2803, ¶ 127 (Ont. Ct. J. June 24, 2003).
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relied on indirect evidence (for example that the complainant would not
have had unprotected intercourse with two men) to find a lack of consent
against defendants’ claims to the contrary. 25 Moreover, in an important
and recent decision (discussed below), the Alberta Court of Appeal
found that there is no defense of “prior consent,” because consent must
be operative at the time sexual contact takes place. 26
Together, legislative provisions and doctrine have moved Canadian
law firmly in the direction of realizing affirmative consent. In
comparative terms, Canada appears to have moved much closer to this
standard than most other Anglo-American jurisdictions. 27 I do not mean
to suggest that a specific and positive consent standard is by now firmly
entrenched within Canadian law. Indeed as Rakhi Ruparelia has
demonstrated, the Ewanchuk rules have been inconsistently applied by
trial judges and many sexual assault decisions are infused by myths and
stereotypes that continue to prevent legal recognition of unwanted sexual
intrusions. 28 In fact, the thrust of this article is to explore the limits of a
specific and affirmative consent standard and the manner in which
complainants’ claims continue to be discounted and disqualified. But in
order to explore these limits and clarify these mechanisms of
disqualification, it is necessary to disentangle the meaning of the legal
embrace of “only yes means yes” in the context of the present.
III. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT AND NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY
What does it mean when legal standards for sexual consent shift
25. R. v. J.R., [2006] O.J. No. 2698, ¶ 59 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. June 30, 2006). For a discussion
of post-Ewanchuk cases involving intoxicated complainants, see Gotell, supra note 13, at 146-47.
26. R. v. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040 (Alta. C.A. Aug. 23, 2006).
27. Reforms in England and Wales have also moved towards affirmative consent, especially
in modifying the mens rea element of the offense by inserting a reasonableness standard; the
reasonableness of belief in consent is to be assessed contextually, in light of the surrounding
circumstances, including the steps taken to ascertain whether the complainant was consenting. See
Vanessa. E. Munro, Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating Constraint in the
Expression of Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 923 (2008). Yet there are two reasons why I
would argue that Canadian law has moved more firmly in the direction of affirmative consent.
First, in English/Welsh law, new statutory definitions of consent and of mistaken belief relate to
rape, defined by a penetrative standard. In Canadian sexual assault law, by contrast, all forms of
non-consensual sexual touching are criminalized. Statutory provisions, combined with Ewanchuk
rules, have established that consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual encounter, requiring the
affirmative expression of consent and active steps to ensure agreement, when activities shift from
one form of activity to another. This comes close to a communicative standard. Second, reforms in
England and Wales are in their earliest stage of interpretation. In Canada, by contrast, doctrine
surrounding consent has developed and accumulated to the extent that interpretive tests and
standards have begun to “settle.”
28. Ruparelia, supra note 13.
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from “no means no” to “only yes means yes”? Is this an indication of
the successes of feminist legal reform? While recognizing how
affirmative consent standards are capable of providing enhanced legal
recognition of women’s sexual autonomy, we must at the same time
interrogate the legal embrace of “yes means yes” in relation to broader
shifts in governance and the new privileged forms of citizenship they
produce.
To be sure, the elaboration of a positive and explicit consent
standard in Canadian law means that a concept of sexual autonomy is
given increased weight and that it is now far less likely that acquiescence
will be transformed into consent. What Carol Smart has labelled the
“pleasurable phallocentric pastime” of pressing a woman until she
submits is disrupted through emerging legal standards. 29 Clear words
and actions signalling consent are required and judges are placing onus
on those who initiate sexual contact to secure agreement. As this occurs,
the masculine gaze that has long defined the consent/coercion dichotomy
is surely diluted. The judicial articulation of an affirmative consent
standard challenges a dominant (hetero)sexual script built upon forceful
seduction. 30 Yet at the same time, this shift in judicial approaches and
standards requires careful and critical analysis, using new critical tools.
In the past, feminist legal theorists have deployed metaphors of
disqualification and silencing to account for legal responses to sexual
violation. 31 In the current context, we must pay more careful attention
to the manner in which stories of sexual violation are being both
produced and heard, and to how, in the long shadow of these legitimized
stories, constructions of normative heterosexuality are being
transformed.
In one of the first extensive commentaries on the Ewanchuk
decision, Renu Mandhane considered the standard for consent that the
decision established using “law and economics” approaches and feminist
theory. 32 Mandhane contends that the Ewanchuk rules can indeed be
justified through criteria such as economic efficiency; but feminist
arguments, she insists, are more appropriate as a theoretical justification

29. CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 45 (Routledge 1989).
30. Joanne Wright, Consent and Sexual Violence in Canadian Public Discourse: Reflections
on Ewanchuk, 16 CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y. 173, 184-91 (2001).
31. CAROL SMART, Law’s power, the sexed body, feminist discourse, in LAW, CRIME AND
SEXUALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINISM 83-84 (Sage 1995) (arguing, for example, that “[t]he process of
the rape trial can be described as a specific mode of sexualization of a woman’s body” with the
precise and intended effect of disqualifying her testimony and experience of sexual assault).
32. Mandhane, supra note 13.
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because they “more adequately account for the paramount interests of
women in the realm of sexual assault.” 33 Mandhane is critical of the
recent imperialism of the “law and economics” paradigm because of the
inappropriateness of using economic approaches and concepts to
understand “non-economic” problems such as sexual coercion.
What if we consider economic logic, cost and benefit calculations,
and rules imposed to reduce inefficiencies less as modes of theoretical
justification for the Ewanchuk consent rules and more as expressions of
the imperialism of economic rationalities in the context of neoliberal
governmentality? Here Mandhane’s analysis becomes both prescient
and suggestive. While reiterating compelling feminist critiques of his
work, in particular its moral neutrality, Mandhane draws on Richard
Posner to elaborate on how stringent consent standards operate to
increase the “price” of coercive sex, inducing “individuals” to refrain
from rape and substitute consensual sex. 34 In Mandhane’s view,
however, Posner’s analysis is incomplete because it fails to consider the
social costs of rape (its harmful effects for women). 35 From a normative
economic perspective, the Ewanchuk rules are efficient because they
compel individuals to take into account the negative externalities (social
costs) of sexually coercive actions. As Mandhane writes:
[T]he consent rules articulated in Ewanchuk represent a Pareto
improvement in the allocation of sexual conduct. First, a rule that
requires positive conduct indicating consent, in order to establish an air
of reality to the defence of mistake of fact, may make it easier to
determine whether or not the transaction in question is a product of the
voluntary agreement of all parties. Requiring an affirmative indication
of consent reduces the ambiguity present in sexual encounters. Indeed,
some economic theorists have suggested that the whole purpose of
criminal law is to force people to bargain within the confines of the
market - which requires agreement - in situations where they might not
otherwise do so . . . . 36

When considered through the lens of economics, normalized sexual

33. Id. at 227.
34. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (Harvard University Press 1993); Mandhane,
supra note 13, at 192-95. For feminist critiques of Posner, see Martha A. Fineman, The
Hermeneutics of Reason: A Commentary on Sex and Reason 25 CONN. L.R. 503 (1993); Robin
West, Sex, Reason and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413 (1993); Gillian K. Hadfield,
Flirting with Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics of Sexual Man, 106 HARVARD L.R. 479
(1992); Katherine T. Bartlett, Rumpelstiltskin, 25 CONN. L.R. 473 (1993).
35. Mandhane, supra note 13, at 195.
36. Id. at 200.
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interaction becomes understood as being like a market transaction.
Affirmative consent standards and limitations on the defense of mistaken
belief operate as inducements for revealing preferences and for ensuring
that others’ preferences be respected. Stringent mens rea requirements
mean that the negative externalities of individual transactions must be
taken into account, thereby reducing the inefficiencies of coercive
heterosexuality.
Mandhane’s analysis alerts us to the manner in which reformulated
legal standards for sexual consent might be seen as an active
reconfiguration of sexual interactions in a manner that infuses normative
sexuality with an entrepreneurial logic. It forces us to consider how law,
in and through criminal legal adjudication, could be seen as expressing
and enacting a neoliberal rationality of governance. As described by
Wendy Brown, neoliberal rationality is not primarily focused on the
market. 37 Instead neoliberal governmentality represents the extension
and dissemination of market values to all institutions and social action,
with all dimensions of human life cast in terms of market rationality. 38
Contesting the principles of public provision and rule associated with the
Keynesian state, neoliberal governmentality interpellates individuals as
rational and fully responsible entrepreneurial actors. As Brown
emphasizes, this strategy of governing does not assume economic
rationality as ontological. Instead neoliberal governmentality is a
constructivist project, a technique of governing, which through policy,
law, and discourse, seeks to develop and diffuse a market rationality. 39
This governing technology relies on the active production of new forms
of privileged subjectivity, constructing and forming individuals as
rational calculating creatures, defined by their capacity for self-care and
bearing full responsibility for the consequences of their actions. 40
What would it mean to think about revised consent standards,
enacted in and through judicial decision-making, in relation to these
emerging methods of governance and control?
Some scholars
attempting to construct a more robust Foucaultian analysis of law have
argued that we must be attentive to how law, including criminal law, has
become captured by modern techniques of power: governmentality and

37. WENDY BROWN, Neoliberalism and the end of Liberal Democracy, in EDGEWORKS:
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 39-40 (Princeton University Press 2005).
38. Id. at 40.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 42-43.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/3

10

Gotell: Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law
GOTELL_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 3:13 PM

RETHINKING AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT IN CANADIAN SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW

875

discipline. 41 In this view, law must no longer be viewed primarily as a
mechanism for preventing harmful transgressions through punishment.
Instead, law is a site for disposing more efficiently of relationships
between members of the population. Law exerts power by engaging in
the conduct of conduct. Legal decisions on sexual assault do not simply
fix the line between rape and normal heterosexuality; these discourses
prescribe normative heterosexuality, and privileged forms of masculinity
and femininity. 42 Judicial decisions enact a performative repetition of
normative heterosexuality, shifting and adjusting relations between
members of the population. Scholars working in the field of critical
criminology have elaborated on how new technologies of governance
rely on responsibilization and risk management as strategies of crime
control; 43 but there has been too little attention to how judicial decisions
may play a role in the governance of crime “at a distance.” In this case,
law at its most “lawlike,” produces idealized subjects who actively
manage the risk of sexual assault and criminalization. The new and
privileged forms of sexual citizenship constructed through the judicial
elaboration of affirmative consent also create new forms of exclusion
and disqualification.
IV. RISK MANAGEMENT AND SEXUAL SUBJECTIVITY
Anchoring post-Ewanchuk sexual assault decisions are
reconstructions of good victimhood and idealized masculine sexual
subjects. New consent standards, alongside restrictions on sexual
history evidence, have meant that traditional means of discrediting
complainants have lost purchase. When standards for consent are raised
to “only yes means yes,” consent is understood as an active and ongoing
process that can be withdrawn at any time. When responsibility is
placed on those initiating sex to take steps to ensure agreement, chastity
and sexual virtue are eroded as the essential prerequisites of good
victimhood.
Moreover, when masculine sexual behavior is
reconstructed according to a norm of active consent seeking, the line
between normative heterosexuality and sexual assault shifts.
Interrogating these shifting lines demands a careful scrutiny of judicial

41. Vanessa E. Munro, Legal Feminism and Foucault – A Critique of the Expulsion of Law 28
J. L. & SOC’Y. 546 (2001); Victor Tadros, Between Governance and Discipline – The Law and
Michel Foucault, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (1998).
42. Gotell, supra note 13, at 134-35.
43. David Garland, Governmentality and the Problem of Crime, 1 THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 173 (1997).
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discourses with attention to the ways in which legal decisions prescribe
and actively form new sexual subjectivities.
Animating the judicial elaboration of a positive consent standard is
an ideal masculine sexual subject constituted through the transactional
logic of new consent norms. He is a subject who embraces sexual
responsibility and assumes the risk of criminalization when he fails to
take active steps to ensure consent. He is rational, subjecting his sexual
actions to the calculus of risk avoidance. He asks, rather than takes, and
those who fail to ask are constructed as failed risk managers. The
discourse of risk and risk calculation pervades judicial descriptions of
departures from standards of rational masculine sexual subjectivity:
The evidence of Rodas was that . . . her response was non-verbal and
was to the effect that she kept kissing him . . . .non-verbal behaviours,
when relied upon as expression of consent, must be unequivocal . . .
avoidance of serious risk-taking . . . demands that reasonable steps be
taken, not themselves involving sexually assaultive activity, to clarify
the limits of any agreement to sexual touching. 44
Someone in [the defendant’s] circumstances takes a serious risk by
founding an assumption of consent on passivity and non-verbal
responses as justification for assuming that consent exists. 45
He has spoken about receiving counseling with respect to how to
recognize and deal with high-risk situations. He has testified at
various points that he recognized that the situation he found himself
in . . . was a high-risk situation. 46
The person who assaults an unconscious woman cannot know whether,
were she conscious, she would revoke the earlier consent. He therefore
takes the risk that she may later claim she was assaulted without
consent. 47

Here risk becomes a mechanism for manipulating sexual behavior and
for promoting self-regulation. It is the risk of criminalization, rather
than insistence on respect for sexual autonomy or recognition of the
harmful consequence of coerced sex, that functions as the main
inducement to comply with a specific consent standard. This point must

44. R v. Rodas, [1999] O.J. No. 4503 QUICKLAW, ¶ 89 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 1999).
45. R v. Cornejo, 68 O.R. (3d) 117, ¶ 21 (Ont. C.A. 2003).
46. R. v. Patrick, [2002] B.C.J. No. 2261 QUICKLAW, ¶ 19 (B.C. Prov. Ct. Sept. 10, 2002).
47. R. v. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, ¶ 28 (Alta. C.A. Aug 23, 2006) (quoting R. v. Esau,
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 777, ¶ 73 (Can.)).
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be underlined. Indeed, as many scholars have noted, despite the clear
influence of feminist law reformers on the 1992 Criminal Code
amendments, the application of these provisions appears to have
proceeded without any significant reliance on feminist principles. While
the objectives of promoting sexual equality, reducing the widespread
problem of sexual violence against women and children, and enhancing
women’s sexual autonomy were clearly articulated by legislators, rarely
are these rationales for avoiding sexual assault relied on in the reported
case law. 48
The active production of a risk-averse rational sexual subject is
evident in judicial decisions. In fact, the constructivist and pedagogic
nature of judicial discourses of affirmative consent becomes strikingly
explicit at points. In a decision convicting four young teenage boys for
repetitively groping the buttocks and breasts of a twelve-year-old girl in
the hallways of a public school, the deciding judge concludes by
recommending that the Ewanchuk decision should be “compulsory
reading” in schools. 49 Affirmative consent standards built upon risk and
responsibility demonstrate the normalizing and disciplinary impetus of
sexual assault decisions.
The idealized sexual subjects produced through a judicial pedagogy
of responsibilization are, of course, gendered. The liberal legal
discourse of consent is itself gendered, reinforcing an active masculine
sexuality and a reactive and passive feminine sexuality and identifying
the measure of sexual violence as not whether a woman desires sex, but
instead whether she accedes. 50 As Wendy Brown has argued, consent is

48. For an analysis of pre-Ewanchuk decisions and the argument that the judicial
interpretation and application of the consent provisions has excluded feminist and equality
principles, see John McInnes and Christine Boyle, Judging Sexual Assault Law Against a Standard
of Equality 29 U.B.C. L. REV. 341 (1995). For an analysis of post-Ewanchuk decisions, see Gotell,
supra note 13, at 146-53; Ruparelia, supra note 13, at 168-71.
49. R. v. M.A., [2005] O.J. No. 4766 QUICKLAW, ¶ 77 (Ont. Ct. J.).
50. Kevin Bonnycastle, Rape Uncodified: Reconsidering Bill C-49 Amendments to Canadian
Sexual Assault Laws, in LAW AS A GENDERING PRACTICE 60, 73-74 (Dorothy Chunn & Dany
Lacombe eds., Oxford University Press 2000). Catherine MacKinnon makes a similar point when
she writes:
[W]hen the law of rape finds consent to sex, it does not look to see whether the parties
were social equals in any sense, nor does it require mutuality or positive choice in sex,
far less simultaneity of desire. The doctrine of consent in the law of forcible rape
envisions instead unilateral initiation (the stereotyped acted/acted-upon model of maledominant sex) followed by accession or not by persons tacitly presumed equal.
Catherine MacKinnon, A Sexual Equality Approach to Sexual Assault, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
SCI. 265, 267 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
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both a sign of subordination and the means of its legitimation. 51 Yet as
discourses of consent become infused with the logic of risk and actively
disseminate new forms of rational sexual subjectivity, the gendered
nature of consent is both reinforced and reframed. The mens rea of
sexual assault becomes increasingly tied to, and measured by, what a
“reasonable man” would do in the circumstances. Likewise, a
specifically feminine rationality is disseminated, which shifts the
fulcrum of the dichotomy between a legally valorized victim and an
unworthy, incredible complainant. Privileged masculine and feminine
sexual subjectivities, both measured against a criterion of
reasonableness, are both responsibilized through a calculus of risk,
though in distinctly gendered ways.
Risk as a technology of governing is intrinsically gendered. 52
Critical criminologists such as Pat O’Malley and David Garland argue
that a central feature of new crime prevention strategies is “selfdiscipline;” the promotion of safe-keeping and private prudentialism are
mechanisms for individualizing and privatizing crime control, shifting
the problem of crime away from the state and onto would-be victims. 53
As Elizabeth Stanko emphasizes, however, for women, safekeeping is a
“technology of the soul,” with the appreciation of risk of male violence
long constitutive of feminine identity. 54 While not “new,” women’s fear
of male violence and the accompanying demands of risk avoidance are
intensified in the present and constituted as performative of respectable
femininity. 55 As Rachel Hall contends, contemporary rape prevention
discourses infused with a logic of risk management must be seen as
revised versions of older understandings about the role of fear in
women’s lives. 56 Rape prevention discourses increasingly treat rape as a
virtual and ever-present possibility and danger in women’s lives,
offering agency only through avoidance. Within a universe of rape
management constituted in and through discourses of risk, the
performance of diligent and cautious femininity grants some women

51. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 163
(Princeton University Press 1995).
52. Elizabeth Stanko, Safety Talk: Conceptualizing Women’s Safekeeping as a Technology of
Risk, 1 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 479 (1997); Sandra Walklate, Risk and Criminal
Victimization: A Modernist Dilemma?, 37 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 35 (1997).
53. Pat O’Malley, Risk, Power and Crime Prevention, 21 ECON. & SOC’Y 252; Garland,
supra note 43.
54. Stanko, supra note 52.
55. Id. at 489.
56. Rachel Hall, It Can Happen to You: Rape Prevention in the Age of Risk Management
19(3) HYPATIA 2, 3 (2004).
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access to good citizenship, while women who fail to follow the rules of
safekeeping can be denied recognition. 57
The prudent and responsibilized feminine sexual subject weaves
through judicial discourses of affirmative consent. Concepts of risk are
deployed to construct and demarcate revised boundaries of good and bad
victimhood. While the idealized masculine sexual citizen, constituted in
and through an affirmative consent standard, is he who rationally
responds to the risks of criminalization through consent seeking, the
idealized feminine sexual subject is she who actively manages her
behavior to avoid the ever-present risk of sexual violence. The new
“ideal” and valorized victim is a responsible, security conscious, crimepreventing subject who acts to minimize her own sexual risk. She is a
“(re)action hero” with “expert awareness of her own vulnerabilities.” 58
Victim-blaming constructions emerge repeatedly in judicial discourses
when complainants fail to behave as responsible risk managers:
Her apparent maturity and intelligence make it puzzling why at 16
years of age she elected to accompany her friend to C.R.N.’s . . . . By
my count there were five young men living at the smallish residence,
two of whom had their girlfriends staying over. Almost all, including
the complainant, were drinking . . . . Her parents were out of town. It
is not unfair, I think to say, putting herself in this setting was of
questionable judgment, questionable maturity, careless and without
much concern for her personal security. 59
Her youthful naivety dulled her natural defences. P.B. got into their
car firmly believing that they were “cool” guys, going to drive her
back to the orchard. 60
No doubt, Mr. C., even at the age of 19 years, was naïve in the
extreme. 61

Here, even as judges convict, complainants are depicted as
behaving carelessly for failing to recognize the sexual risks inherent in
perfectly normal social interactions (including, as in the above cases
respectively, attending a party, accepting a ride from or visiting
prospective employers). Failing to display appropriate caution is often
excused as youthful ignorance, a situational and temporal deviation from
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
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Id. at 10; Stanko, supra note 52, at 486.
This is Hall’s concept. Hall, supra note 56, at 6.
R. v. C.R.N., [1999] O. J. No. 3918 QUICKLAW, ¶ 14 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
R. v. Cheema, [2003] B.C.J. No. 262 QUICKLAW, ¶ 98 (B.C. Prov. Ct. Jan. 30, 2003).
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the norms of a mature and cautious femininity. Nonetheless, careless
disregard for personal safety becomes a site for an altered form of
victim-blaming, as complainants are constructed as flirting with risk. In
a decision (described above) convicting four young teenage boys of
sexual assault for the repeated sexual touching of a schoolmate, the
judge engages in overt victim-blaming by arguing that the complainant
is responsible for letting the situation go unchecked:
I find that she was a non-assertive 12-year old who to some extent
showed signs of weakness and unfortunately allowed herself to be
taken advantage of. In her own immature mind she hoped that this
would simply stop and go away . . . . One gets the sense from [sic] the
complainant not doing much to stop the grabbing and to continue
giving hugs to some of the accused is that she was stuck in a situation
not really knowing how to get out of it and through immaturity,
innocence, ignorance and fear of not wanting to rock the boat. 62

Not only are good feminine sexual subjects expected to avoid risky
situations, they are also expected to respond assertively and decisively in
the face of sexual threats and to seek immediate protection.
Positioned paradoxically an actively diligent “victim in waiting,”
the idealized feminine subject produces new axes of victim-blaming and
also functions as a standard for assessing the credibility of actual
complainants. Complainants’ behaviors are explicitly measured against
the normalized risk-avoiding behaviors of the “reasonable woman.” The
Manitoba Court of Appeal’s decision in A. v. A.J.S. 63 is illustrative. The
thrust of the appeal was that the complainant’s reactions during the
period in question were unexpected or unusual, thereby rendering her
testimony unbelievable and the jury conviction unreasonable. The much
older defendant was married to the complainant’s sister and the
complainant alleged that he had repeatedly raped her between 1976 and
2002. Her “unusual” behaviors included “voluntarily living with the
accused” 64 and being alone with him in her own basement; 65 but the
appellate bench seemed most puzzled by the fact that the complainant
had borrowed a lawnmower from a man who had by this point assaulted
her on many occasions:
Some of the complainant’s own conduct seems bizarre. For example,
in her examination-in-chief, the complainant related how for more than

62.
63.
64.
65.

R. v. M.A., [2005] O.J. No. 4766 QUICKLAW, ¶ 69-70 (Ont. Ct. J.).
R. v. A.J.S., [2005] M.J. No. 1 (Man. C.A. Jan. 10, 2005).
Id. at ¶ 13.
Id. at ¶ 22.
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a single summer, she would arrange to borrow the accused’s
lawnmower in order to cut the grass on her property. This was not an
ordinary lawnmower, but one on which the operator could ride,
intended for large properties. To obtain the lawnmower meant
requesting that the accused transport it to the complainant’s house by
truck on numerous occasions during the spring and summer months.
On these occasions, the accused allegedly seized the opportunity to
rape the complainant in her house. On some occasions, the
complainant made sure that one of her sons was present when the
lawnmower was delivered and/or when the accused returned to reclaim
it. On other occasions, when no one was around, as noted earlier, she
tried to lock herself in the house, or, if he gained entry, then in the
bathroom, to escape his unwanted advances. Her testimony begs the
question raised on cross-examination: Why would she put herself at
risk of being raped for the sole reason of borrowing a lawnmower to
66
cut the grass?

The Court’s characterization of the complainant’s actions as
bizarre, unexpected and unusual rests on a decontextualized view of risk
avoidance, ignoring how a woman living in poverty, in a remote
northern community, might need to continue to interact with a sexually
abusive man. In this decision, the Court of Appeal ultimately finds that
the jury verdict was not unreasonable and that the defense of mistaken
belief lacked an “air of reality,” principally on the basis that the accused
had not testified. 67 Nonetheless, the Court’s explicit emphasis on how
credibility is undermined by “abnormal” risk-taking behaviors operates
as a powerful demonstration of transformed contours of the ideal
victimhood and the ties between risk-taking and incredibility.
As Wendy Larcombe emphasizes, the line between the ideal victim
and incredible complainant is neither fixed nor eternal. 68 As she too has
argued, the discursively produced ideal victim is no longer defined
exclusively nor primarily by traditional qualities of sexual morality and
chastity. Instead, consistency, rationality, and risk-avoidance constitute
new markers of normative conduct against which the behaviors and
credibility of actual complainants are measured and assessed. 69 Within
recent Canadian sexual assault decisions, good sexual citizens are
reconfigured as being like rational economic actors, assuming

66. Id. at ¶ 17.
67. Id. at ¶ 39.
68. Wendy Larcombe, The 'Ideal' Victim V Successful Rape Complainants: Not What You
Might Expect 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 131 (2002).
69. Id. at 145.
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responsibility for their actions and the risks that they take. Under the
standard of explicit consent, what is bad and untrustworthy is being
redefined. As normalized sexual subjects are increasingly reconfigured
through concepts of responsibility and risk, so too is the untrustworthy
complainant reconstituted. The inverse opposite of the rape-preventing
subject is the risky woman, the woman who avoids personal
responsibility for sexual safety, the woman who places herself within
and occupies a space of risk. The risky woman slides into the traditional
place of the promiscuous woman under new logics of consent.
V. RISKY WOMEN AS OTHER AND OUTSIDE THE TRANSACTIONAL
SEXUAL ECONOMY
In R. v. M.S., 70 R. v. Ashlee 71 and R. v. Edmondson, 72 the
complainants share marginalized social locations that render them highly
vulnerable to sexual violence. The complainants in both M.S. and
Ashlee are drug-addicted and living on the streets, while the twelve-year
old complainant in Edmondson is an aboriginal girl who is running away
from home. Systemic relations of race, class, and gender, silenced in
judicial discourses of positive consent, interact to construct some
women’s bodies as violable. The Native Women’s Association of
Canada (NWAC) estimates that hundreds of aboriginal women and girls
have gone missing in the last 20 years in circumstances involving
violence. 73 While there has been no systematic study of sexual violence
endured by aboriginal women, statistical research on reported sexual
assaults suggests that aboriginal women face rates that are many times
higher than other Canadian women. 74 Sherene Razack highlights the
centrality of sexual violence in ongoing relations of colonization. 75 As
she has argued, colonization has marked the social geography of
Western Canada, creating boundaries between white middle class
spaces, ruled by norms of universal justice, and the racialized spaces of

70. [2003] A.J. No. 1516, (Alta. Prov. Ct. Nov. 27, 2003).
71. 391 A.R. 62 (ABCA 2006).
72. 257 Sask. R. 270 (Sask. C.A. 2005).
73. Amnesty International (Canada), Stolen Sisters: A Human Rights Response to
Discrimination and Violence Against Aboriginal Women in Canada (Ottawa: Amnesty International
Canada, 2004) at 24.
74. Holly Johnson, Measuring Violence Against Women: Statistical Trends STATISTICS
CANADA
CATALOGUE
NO.
85-570-XIE,
64-69
(2006),
available
at
http://www.statcan.ca/english/research/85-570-XIE/85-570-XIE2006001.pdf.
75. Sherene H. Razack, Gendered Racial Violence and Spatialized Justice: The Murder of
Pamela George, 15 CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y. 91 (2000).
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the inner city and reserve, constructed as zones of violence. In her
brilliant analysis of the trial of two white university students accused of
sexually assaulting and murdering an aboriginal woman, Razack
demonstrates how “bodies in degenerate spaces lose their entitlement to
personhood through a complex process in which the violence that is
enacted is naturalized.” 76 Through such spatial divisions and as an
effect of colonial relations, aboriginal women and girls become
legitimate targets of violence, particularly violence enacted by white
men.
Homeless and addicted women living in what Razack has described
as the “degenerate spaces” where violence is normalized occupy social
positions that are analogous to aboriginal women. Marked increases in
homeless populations on the streets of Calgary and Edmonton are
classed effects of the booming Alberta oil economy, accompanying
housing shortages and the evisceration of social entitlements enacted by
neoliberal provincial governments since the 1990s. 77 Homeless women
experience extremely high rates of sexual violence and research suggests
that familial abuse and sexual violence are major factors contributing to
the homelessness of young women. 78 Many people living on the streets
of Alberta’s cities are of aboriginal descent. 79 That the decisions in
Ashlee and M.S. do not identify the complainants as aboriginal does not
mean that they are not; in the decontextualized discursive economy of
judicial decisions, the race of complainants and defendants is rarely
specified.
When filtered through norms of risk-management and sexual
safekeeping, however, the gendered, racialized and classed power
relations producing and constructing vulnerabilities disappear. In and

76. Id. at 129.
77. DIANA GIBSON, TAMING THE TEMPEST: AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR
ALBERTA iv (Parkland Institute 2007).
78. Suzanne L. Wenzel et al., Toward a More Comprehensive Understanding of Violence
Against Impoverished Women, 21 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 820, 829 (2006); RUSTY NEAL,
VOICES: WOMEN, POVERTY AND HOMELESSNESS IN CANADA, 10 (National Anti-Poverty
Organization 2004); MICHAEL SHAPCOTT, WELLESLEY INSTITUTE BACKGROUNDER: PHYSICAL AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE RATES FOR HOMELESS MANY TIMES HIGHER THAN HOUSED (Wellesley
Institute 2007), available at http://wellesleyinstitute.com/files/violence_backgrounder.pdf.
79. The most recent counts of homeless populations in Edmonton and Calgary found that 38%
of all homeless people in Edmonton are aboriginal and that 38% of homeless women in Calgary are
aboriginal: EDMONTON JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE ON HOUSING, OUT IN THE COLD: A COUNT OF
HOMELESS PERSONS IN EDMONTON 5 (Edmonton Joint Planning Committee on Housing 2006);
CITY OF CALGARY, COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD SERVICES POLICY AND PLANNING DIVISION.
RESULTS OF THE 2006 COUNT OF HOMELESS PERSONS IN CALGARY 17 (City of Calgary 2006). The
Edmonton count did not calculate the racial composition of the homeless women population.
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through the responsibilized logic of neoliberal discourse, vulnerability is
reconstructed as an individual problem and an effect of risk-taking. Just
as neoliberal discourse pathologizes welfare recipients and constructs the
poor as individually blameworthy for their poverty, so too is the violence
enacted on the bodies of vulnerable women personalized and
individualized. 80 The discourse of “high risk lifestyle” has framed
criminal justice and investigatory responses to missing and murdered
women in Western Canada. 81 Echoing, yet hyperbolizing the safety
pedagogies described by Stanko and Hall, 82 the rapes, murders, and
disappearances of women in the sex trade and aboriginal women and
girls are framed as problems to be addressed through strategies of risk
avoidance and self-management. Women are counseled to avoid taking
risky actions and placing themselves vulnerable situations; and
extremely marginalized women who are victimized become defined by
and reduced to their “high risk lifestyles.” A Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) website providing a list of “safety tips” for women “at
risk,” emphasizes that the “most important tip is not to be involved in a
high risk profession, lifestyle or activity such as prostitution or
hitchhiking.” 83 “These activities,” according to the RCMP, “make you
very vulnerable to becoming a victim.” 84
What happens in law when complainants behave in ways that can
be viewed as exemplifying defiant disregard for their own sexual safety?
As described above, judges often characterize risk-taking behaviors as
temporary departures from the norms of responsibilized feminine sexual
subjectivity. Yet there is a distinction between this state of temporary
deviation and women and girls who by their “high risk lifestyles” can be
seen as literally occupying spaces of risk. An examination of the
decisions in M.S., Edmondson, and Ashlee reveals how risky behaviors,
especially when risk becomes inscribed on the very identities of

80. See Janet Mosher, Welfare Reform and the Re-Making of the Model Citizen, in POVERTY:
RIGHTS, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP, LEGAL ACTIVISM 119 (Margot Young et al., eds., UBC Press 2007)
for a discussion of the pathologization of welfare dependency. I am making an analogous argument.
81. The mandate of Project Kare, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) taskforce
investigating more than 80 cases of missing and murdered women in Alberta, is as follows: “The
‘Project KARE’ Task Force will pursue strategies to minimize the risk of having additional HIGH
RISK MISSING PERSONS (HRMP) murdered within the Provincial Capital Region. Furthermore,
investigational strategies have been developed to investigate all leads, capture and prosecute the
offender(s) responsible for these murders.” RCMP, PROJECT KARE, Project Mandate, (emphasis in
original), available at http://www.kare.ca/content/view/8/19/ (last visited January 27, 2008).
82. Stanko, supra note 52; Hall, supra note 56.
83. RCMP, PROJECT KARE, Safety Tips, available at http://www.kare.ca/content/view/14/24/.
84. Id.
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complainants, can result in legal disqualification. In cases where sexual
assault complainants are intoxicated, hitchhiking runaways, or drugaddicted women living on the street, riskiness becomes perpetual and
ever-present. I do not mean to suggest that the claims of such risky
women or girls are routinely discounted. Indeed, the outcomes in these
cases are distinct. Yet, when read together, they demonstrate how
riskiness becomes tied to incredibility under norms of risk-avoidance
and rational sexual behavior. Moreover, when complainants’ behaviors
appear as irrational under norms of risk avoidance, the legal standards of
affirmative and explicit consent can be weakened or even disregarded.
As I have argued, the application of new consent standards involves the
“objective” measuring of defendants’ actions against the idealized
behaviors of the responsibilized masculine subject (he who takes steps to
ensure consent). When complainant actions are constituted as risky and
irrational, however, deviations from the standard of responsibilized
masculine sexuality can be, and often are, excused and normalized.
In M.S., the alleged assault occurred after the complainant had
gone to an inner city park with a man she had met only that day and after
she blacked out from consuming painkillers and alcohol. 85 By her
testimony, when A.R. awoke, she was being brutally sexually attacked
by the defendant: “she was screaming and that the more she screamed,
the more she got hurt.” 86 The complainant claimed that the defendant
forced his penis into her vagina, anus and mouth and that he had beaten
her and dragged her across the grass when she tried to run away. 87 A
passerby heard the complainant say, “with some desperation,” three
separate times, “can you help me, I’m being raped.” 88 This witness
found the accused on top of the A.R. having sexual intercourse. 89 He
loudly ordered the accused to “get off her” and waited “approximately
thirty seconds” for him to comply. 90 The doctor who performed the
sexual assault exam testified that the complainant had several scratches
and scrapes, vaginal and anal tearing and that this constellation of
injuries “was consistent with sexual assault.” 91
How it is possible that A.R.’s strongly corroborated allegation of
having been violently sexually assaulted was discounted and the accused

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
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R. v. M.S., [2003] A.J.No. 1516, ¶ 4 (Alta. Prov. Ct. Nov. 27, 2003).
Id. at ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶ 6-8 (complainant’s testimony).
Id. at ¶ 20.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at ¶ 22; but see id. at ¶ 21.
Id. at ¶ 28. Doctor’s testimony is described at ¶ 26-28.
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acquitted? Sexual assaults most often occur in private without direct
witnesses, and convictions are entered based upon the uncorroborated
evidence of complainants. In this respect, M.S. is an unusual case. On
the strength of witness testimony and medical evidence, it would seem
that a conviction in this case should have been likely. As I have shown,
the affirmative consent standards established in Ewanchuk require
active, ongoing consent, and when a complainant says “no,” the accused
is required to take steps to reestablish willingness to continue. In this
case, A.R. was heard calling for help three times and there was
testimony that even after being confronted by the passer-by, the accused
stayed on top of her for at least thirty seconds. 92 It would appear that he
took no steps to ensure or reestablish consent. This is a decision in
which the “reasonable steps” requirement is actively ignored and in
which the complainant’s repeated sexual refusals are silenced because of
her multiple departures from the idealized norms of sexual safekeeping.
Intoxication marks a critical deviation from the rationalized and
responsibilized norms of the explicit consent standard. Intoxicated
complainants can be constructed as defying standards of sexual
safekeeping by placing themselves at risk; 93 they also frequently do not
remember their sexual assaults, thereby undermining the credibility of
their claims. Yet, as I have argued above, the consolidation of a positive
and specific consent standard has meant that Canadian courts are
increasingly convicting in such cases, finding that to proceed with sex in
circumstances where complainants are very intoxicated or passed out,
without active steps to ensure unequivocal consent, constitutes
recklessness and wilful blindness. 94 In addition, in cases where
complainants are rendered silent as witnesses through their lack of
memory, some judges have relied on indirect evidence to find nonconsent. In R. v. J.R., 95 the complainant, like A.R., was drunk and had
taken drugs, causing her to black out. The deciding judge found that she

92. Id. at ¶ 21; but see id. at ¶ 56-57.
93. Vanessa E. Munro and Emily Finch have demonstrated through mock jury studies how
third party observers often hold intoxicated complainants at least partially responsible for their
victimization. As they found, “the tendency to focus on the complainant’s behaviour and to
attribute responsibility accordingly was more tenacious than had been anticipated, remaining
constant even in situations in which the defendant spiked the complainant’s drink with alcohol.”
Vanessa E. Munro & Emily Finch, The Demon Drink and the Demonized Woman: Socio-sexual
Stereotypes and Responsibility Attribution in Rape Trials Involving Intoxicants, 16 SOC. & L. STUD.
592, 607 (2007).
94. Gotell, supra note 13, at 146-47. See, e.g., R. v. J.A., [2003] O.J. No. 2803, ¶ 128 (Ont.
Ct. J. June 24, 2003); R. v. Cornejo, 68 O.R. (3d) 117, ¶ 18-19 (Ont. C.A. 2003).
95. [2006] O.J. No. 2698, ¶ 59 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. June 20, 2006).
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had not consented by drawing inferences from her usual sexual
behaviors and by her claims that she would not have had unprotected sex
with two men, shortly after an abortion, and after being warned by her
doctor to abstain from sexual intercourse. 96 In decisions like J.R.,
intoxication is treated as a temporary deviation from a rational norm, just
as consent is judged based upon an implicit standard of reasonable
sexual behaviors.
In M.S., however, the complainant’s intoxication is transformed
from a temporary deviation into a state of being, cemented by the
decision’s repeated references to A.R. having several beers outside on
the day of the attack and to her addiction to painkillers. In this way, the
risky behaviors of drinking and drug use slide into the permanent
markers of a “high risk lifestyle.” A.R.’s intoxication at the time of the
assault becomes firmly located in a pathological discourse; she is framed
as a drunken transient, incapable of responsible neo-liberal citizenship or
self-management. She is represented by the defense as untrustworthy on
this basis and her frequent claims that she does not remember are
transformed into lies. 97 In turn, A.R.’s addiction combines with her
homelessness to remove any necessity of assessing consent based upon
what she would not normally do. The decision makes reference to
testimony by A.R.’s common law husband that they had sexual
intercourse twice outside on the day of the attack. 98 Having sex in a
park might be viewed, in other circumstances, as indicating a departure
from what a reasonable woman might do, perhaps providing indirect
evidence of non-consent. Here, however, sex outside, sex that is risky,
sex that defies standards of responsibility, respectability and sexual
safekeeping, marks the complainant herself as a deviant. While she is
assaulted in an inner city park, the dominant image in the judge’s
recounting is of having sex “in the bushes,” a phrase that is repeated
twelve times in the decision. This repetition consolidates A.R.’s
association with a space of degeneracy and wildness, a space where
normal rules do not apply, a space mapped as being outside of the
transactional norms of responsibilized sexual citizenship.
While the transactional requirements of affirmative consent are
displaced in this decision, an economic framework is nonetheless
maintained, giving credence to an alternate account that, in the judge’s

96. Id. at ¶ 38.
97. In recounting her testimony and cross-examination, the decision frequently refers to the
complainant’s inability to remember as “lying.” R. v. M.S., [2003] A.J.No. 1516, ¶ 13-15..
98. Id. at ¶ 18.
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assessment, raises reasonable doubt. A well-corroborated claim of
violent sexual assault is transformed into a story of a sexual bargain
gone wrong through extortion:
[t]he defence says that the complainant actively and expressly
consented to sexual intercourse as part of a bargain to secure a leather
jacket. The defence also argues that the complainant undertook to
change the terms of that bargain during the act of sexual intercourse by
requesting an additional piece of property from the accused, failing
which the complainant would maintain that she had been “raped”. [sic]
In other words, the defence does not argue consent by virtue of silence,
passivity, or ambiguous conduct rather, the defence argues that the
complainant actively consented to sexual intercourse and then
endeavoured to secure additional items of property from the accused
by suggesting that she would allege “rape” unless he gave her the
property in question. 99

A transactional conception of normative heterosexuality, as I have
suggested, is built upon the rationality of actors in a sexual marketplace.
What happens, then, if participants in a sexual transaction defy the rules
of the market by altering the terms of the bargain, by reneging on a
sexual agreement? In this case, the claim of extortion becomes both a
plausible alternative explanation and also a justification for refusing to
apply the legal standard of affirmative and explicit consent. Must a
responsible man still be required to ensure consent when the other
participant in a sexual bargain uses threats and extortion to change its
terms?
Even if the defendant’s account is taken as a true description of
events, the Ewanchuk consent rules clearly require that he have taken
steps to reestablish agreement. Rather than evaluating what steps, if any,
the accused took, the decision highlights his claim that he did not force
A.R. to engage in sexual intercourse 100 and witness testimony that the
defendant had gotten off A.R. when asked. 101 This represents a
complete denial of the Ewanchuk standards, focusing on force, rather
than on the existence of affirmative consent, and erasing the requirement
that consent must be determined from the subjective position of the
complainant, not a passerby. In this displacement of the positive and
explicit consent rules, the complainant’s subjectivity is erased. And by
giving credence to the defendant’s story of extortion, A.R. becomes

99. Id. at ¶ 47.
100. Id. at ¶ 36.
101. Id. at ¶ 21.
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understood as a threat to the responsible masculine sexual subject.
In Edmondson, 102 a high profile Saskatchewan case, a similar form
of disqualification and victim-blaming occurs. In the legal narrative of
this case, the young complainant’s actions and behavior are also
constituted as risky, “irrational,” and outside the logic of a rational
sexual economy. While the accused was convicted in a jury trial, the
complainant’s “unpredictability” was used as a mitigating factor in
sentencing. Both the conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal,
though the charge was reduced from being a party to the offense of
sexual assault with two other men, contrary to the “gang rape”
provisions of the Criminal Code, 103 to simple sexual assault. 104
The twelve-year-old Yellow Quill First Nation girl was running
away from home. 105 At the time that she was assaulted, she was less
than five feet tall and weighed eighty-seven pounds. 106 It is possible that
she was running away because her father had sexually abused her. She
was sitting on the steps of a small town bar. She accepted a ride from
three white men who were leaving the bar. She supplied them with a
false name and told them she was fourteen and from Saskatoon. None of
the men inquired any further about her age. She accepted their offer of
beer, drinking four in less than thirty minutes, leaving her so intoxicated
that she could not stand up. She claimed that she then passed out. The
men drove her to an isolated area. Edmondson tried to have intercourse
with her on the hood of the truck. He continued to hold her while the
two other men attempted intercourse. According to Rosalind Prober,
“[t]he victim’s story never changed during countless police and crown
attorney interviews, at the preliminary hearing and two trials, in media
interviews, to doctors and to her parents and friends.” 107 As in M.S., her
claim was also corroborated. As the Court of Appeal found, “the
complainant’s testimony found confirmation in the accused’s statement
to police, and in the testimony of one of the other men involved in the
occurrence . . . .” 108
How is it possible that such a vicious act of sexual assault against a
vulnerable child could result in a conditional sentence of only two years

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

257 Sask. R. 270 (Sask. C.A. 2005).
CC § 272(1)(d).
Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, at ¶ 109.
Id. at ¶ 54.
Rosalind Prober, What No Child Should Endure: R. v. Edmondson, Kindrat and Brown, 3
BEYOND BORDERS NEWSLETTER 1 (Beyond Borders Inc., Winnipeg, MB, 2003) Fall 2003, at 1.
107. Id.
108. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270 at ¶ 48.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 3
GOTELL_FINAL

890

3/23/2009 3:13 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:865

to be served in the community? How is it possible that culpability was
shifted from the accused to the complainant through a judicial narrative
framing her as the “sexual aggressor”? This case has been held up as an
egregious example of racism within the Canadian legal system. 109 The
trial judge’s remarks during trial, the inadequate sentence, and the Court
of Appeal decision have all been condemned by Canadian aboriginal
organizations. 110 NWAC intervened on appeal to underscore the
importance of sentences that would denounce the sexual violation of
aboriginal girls in a context of pervasive and systemic gendered,
racialized violence. 111 Edmondson can be understood as exemplifying
Razack’s argument that the violation of aboriginal women and girls is an
ongoing repetition of the colonial encounter that is sanctioned by law. 112
Drawing on Razack, Nicholas Bonokoski has argued that the
complainant was “criminalized . . . using all possible colonial
constructions to frame her as a sexual threat to Dead [sic] Edmondson,
the normative white male colonial subject.” 113 As he demonstrates, the
complainant in this case becomes located in a space beyond law, marked
as a “squaw,” and her life only enters the legal process in ways that
sanction the violence done to her.
It is clear that racist and sexualized discourses are mobilized in
Edmondson to erase the complainant’s vulnerability and to excuse the
predatory behavior of the accused. Yet, we must also be attentive to
how and under what terms these processes of disqualification occur.
Under the contractual logic of affirmative consent, colonial
constructions are both mobilized and reconfigured. In this case, as in
M.S., the complainant’s conduct places her outside normative standards
of feminine diligence and sexual caution. And, as with the complainant
in M.S., riskiness is not simply signified by her conduct; it becomes
inscribed upon her identity.
She becomes an irrational and
“unpredictable” element in a transactional sexual economy.

109. Norma Buydens, The “Melfort” Rape and Children’s Rights: Why R. v. Edmondson
Matters to All Canadian Kids, 4 SASKATCHEWAN NOTES 1 (Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, Regina SK 2005); Nicholas Bonokoski, Colonial Constructs and Legally Sanctioned
Sexually violence Consequences in R. V Edmondson, 7 RECONSTRUCTION: STUDIES IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE, available at http://reconstruction.eserver.org/071/bonokoski.shtml.
110. Darren Bernhardt, Not Guilty Verdict in Rape Trial Stirs Protests, CANWEST NEWS
SERVICE,
March
21,
2007,
available
at
http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=e93d8ab5-84b3-4bcc-9f78-b2907541755d.
111. Native Women’s Association of Canada, Factum of the Intervenor, R. v. Edmondson,
(2005) [hereinafter NWAC] (copy on file with author).
112. Razack, supra note 75.
113. Bonokoski, supra note 109, at ¶ 15.
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As I have emphasized, discourses of risk-taking and “living a highrisk lifestyle” function to reconstruct vulnerability as an individual
failing and an effect of risk taking. This reconstruction marks the
judicial narrative in Edmondson, emerging most clearly in the trial
judge’s sentencing report in which the complainant is firmly depicted as
being responsible for her own violation. As NWAC argued in its
intervention at the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, the jury’s verdict in
this case rested on one of three alternate findings of fact with respect to
consent: that “the complainant was incapable of giving consent because
she was 12 years old, and Edmondson had not taken all reasonable steps
to ascertain her age”; 114 that she “was incapable of giving consent
because she was too intoxicated”; 115 or that “the complainant simply did
not consent.” 116 Yet, Judge Kovatch seemed to base his sentence on the
first scenario, proceeding on the basis of “the possibility of willing
participation by [the] complainant . . . in the context of a situation where
a complainant cannot legally consent due to his or her age.” 117 In his
sentencing report, the trial judge drew attention to the fact that she had
lied about her age and had “deliberately” tried to appear older than she
actually was. 118 He highlighted the fact that she had voluntarily chosen
to drink and that she had previously consumed alcohol. 119 In this
manner, attention is deflected away from the fact that the adult defendant
had provided her with so much alcohol that she could not stand up. In
the same way that the complainant in M.S. is identified as a “drunken
transient,” the racist myth of the “drunken Indian” is here mobilized to
locate the complainant in a space of degeneracy and to consolidate a
victim-blaming narrative. 120 That she had experience drinking marks
her as deviant and not like other twelve-year old girls.

114. In Canadian law, there is a three tier-age and capacity based regime for the control of sex
offenses against children focused on sexual exploitation and capacity to consent. Children under 12
are a prohibited category, based on empirical evidence that young children cannot evaluate the
dimensions of consent to sexual activity and are particularly vulnerable to adult control. A partial
prohibition exists for children between 12 and 14 who can consent to sexual activity with a person
within two years of their age, if both are over 12. Children between 14 and 16 cannot consent to
sexual activity with anyone in a position of trust or authority over them, but after age 16 children
can freely consent. CC §§ 150-153; Jeremy Patrick, Sexual Exploitation and the Criminal Code 43
ALTA. L. REV. 1057 (2006).
115. See Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, at ¶ 90.
116. NWAC, supra note 111, at ¶ 8.
117. Id. at ¶ 9. (quoting Transcript of Sentencing Report).
118. R. v. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, ¶ 54 (Sask. C.A. 2005) (quoting the sentencing
report).
119. NWAC, supra note 111, at ¶ 10 (quoting Transcript of Sentencing Report).
120. In a study of 67 cases in which aboriginal women were sexual assaulted, Margo
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It is clear from the evidence that the complainant was left extremely
intoxicated, slipping in and out of consciousness. Her lack of conscious
memory about what happened preceding the sexual assault, as Norma
Buydens suggests, is consistent with a memory black-out. 121 Under an
affirmative consent standard, extreme intoxication has led to judicial
findings that to proceed with sex when one is not sure if the complainant
knew what she was doing constitutes recklessness or willful
blindness. 122 Yet, this young girl’s status as a runaway and an
experienced drinker are used to shift attention away from her state of
vulnerability. She is blamed for her own intoxication; drinking is
framed as being part of her normal behavior, rather than simply a risky
and temporary deviation. And in Judge Kovatch’s sentencing report, the
complainant’s lack of memory becomes a blank space through which,
using the testimony of the accused, the complainant comes to be
understood as a willing participant and a sexual threat.
Emphasizing the complainant’s complicity, the sentencing report
called attention to evidence suggesting that she had entered the
defendant’s truck “willingly,” that she had shown no signs of concern at
the bar prior to the assault and that there was no suggestion that she had
been restrained or held against her will. 123 In the most contentious part
of this report, Judge Kovatch explicitly framed the complainant as “the
aggressor.” 124 How is it possible to construct an intoxicated twelve-year
old girl as the sexual aggressor in an encounter with three adult men on
an isolated rural side road? At trial, the defense had presented evidence
to allege that the complainant was being sexually abused by her father
and that he had vaginal intercourse with her on the day of the attack. 125
The defense had called a local pediatrician as an expert witness who
testified that sexually abused children could behave in “sexually
unpredictable” ways. 126 In his sentencing report, Judge Kovatch
Nightingale demonstrated the ongoing influence of the racist stereotype of the “drunken Indian,”
both on case outcomes and on sentencing. Margo Nightingale, Judicial Attitudes and Differential
Treatment: Native Women in Sexual Assault Cases, 23 OTTAWA L. REV. 71, 87-90. As she shows,
for aboriginal women who are raped, intoxication becomes a form of victim-blaming. Id.
Moreover, aboriginal women who are assaulted when passed out are often considered by judges to
have suffered less of a violation. Id.; see also Sherene H. Razack, “What is to be Gained by
Looking White People in the Eye? Culture, Race and Gender in Cases of Sexual Assault, 19 SIGNS
894, 901 (1994).
121. Buydens, supra note 109, at 2.
122. R. v. J.A., [2003] O.J. No. 2803, ¶ 128 (Ont. Ct. J. June 24, 2003).
123. NWAC, supra note 111, at ¶ 12 (quoting Transcript of Sentencing Report).
124. Id. at ¶ 12.
125. See R. v. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, ¶ 47 (Sask. C.A. 2005).
126. Id. at ¶ 56.
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characterized this testimony as “very troublesome” and framed it as
support for Edmondson’s position that the complainant “was not only a
willing participant, but indeed, the aggressor.” 127 As he insisted, “there
is certainly a doubt in my mind. . . as a result of that evidence,” and that
this fact, “should, in fairness, be taken into account for sentencing
purposes.” 128
As NWAC strongly argued in its intervention on appeal, to reduce
the culpability of offenders who assault abused children on the basis that
many act out is “tantamount to making the Court complicit in the repeat
abuse of children” and is especially worrying “because of the prevalence
As Bonokoski
of sexual abuse against Aboriginal children.” 129
contends, the portrayal of this young complainant as the sexual
aggressor reinforces the racist construction of aboriginal women and
girls as promiscuous, sexually available, and unrapeable. 130 This
framing also responsibilizes the complainant, revealing how, under the
logics of contractual consent, vulnerabilities are erased and victimblaming constructions are mobilized. In this case, the complainant’s
risky behaviors (her drinking, her “lying,” her “hitchhiking”) are
transformed into complicity. Her past sexual victimization results in her
pathologization and sexual unpredictability becomes inscribed upon her
identity. Her victimization is erased in a judicial narrative that reframes
her as a sexual threat.
“Sexual unpredictability” operates here in much the same way that
“sexual extortion” functions in M.S. Sexual unpredictability becomes a
justification for deviations from the consent-seeking standards of
normative masculinity. It is as if the sexual subject positions, produced
through the transactional logics of affirmative consent, exist in a relation
of necessary complimentary. The “unpredictable” behaviors of a young
girl who accepts a ride, drinks beer, and acts in ways that so exceeds the
norms of sexual safekeeping results in a corresponding relaxation of the
requirements of active consent seeking. The complainant becomes, in
effect, a risky woman by virtue of the risk she poses to the masculine
sexual subject.
The defendant, by contrast, is represented as posing no risk at all.
His sexual aggression is constructed as an “isolated criminal act, fuelled
in very significant part by excessive alcohol consumption all round.” 131
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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While drinking operates to undermine the complainant’s credibility and
to consign her to a space of degeneracy, alcohol abuse becomes an
excuse for the defendant’s bad behavior. 132 According to the Court of
Appeal, Judge Kovatch characterized the defendant as “a first time
offender,” “gainfully employed, with a very supportive family.” 133 The
defendant’s deviations from the responsibilized norms of masculine
sexual subjectivity are represented as temporary and inconsistent with
his overall adherence to the requirements of neoliberal citizenship. He is
depicted as a white citizen subject, tied to his family and to the
community. In Judge Kovatch’s assessment, serving a communitybased sentence would not, therefore, “endanger the safety of the
community.” 134
This portrayal of the defendant as “risk-free”
necessarily depends upon on a colonial construction of “community”
that excludes aboriginal women and girls and that views them as the
source of the violence that is inflicted upon them. 135
A separation is enacted between this exclusionary community and
those gendered, classed, and racialized bodies occupying spaces of risk.
In the judicial narratives woven in M.S. and in Edmondson,
responsibilization takes a highly accentuated form, not only blaming
vulnerable women and girls for the risks that they take, but also
reconstructing these risky subjects as sexual threats. In this process, as I
have argued, these complainants are placed outside the logic of the
transactional sexual economy, their subjectivity is siphoned, and
deviations from the active consent-seeking requirements of affirmative
consent are legitimized and excused. The Alberta Court of Appeal
decision in R. v. Ashlee 136 stands in stark contrast to M.S. and
Edmondson. In Ashlee, the defendants are convicted for sexually
touching a woman who, like the complainant in A.R., is both homeless
and intoxicated. More than this, Ashlee is a doctrinally significant case

“account of the personal circumstances” of the defendant, as paraphrased by the Court of Appeal).
132. Razack notes a similar double-standard in her analysis of the trial of an aboriginal woman
beaten to death by two white university students. Their acts of violence were referred to at trial both
by the defense and by the deciding judge as “bad behaviour” due to excessive alcohol consumption.
As she writes, “Alcohol abuse and its accompanying racial and sexual violence were described as
temporary aberrant behaviour, while Pamela George’s “lifestyle” [her work as a prostitute]
remained a permanent personal characteristic.” Razack, supra note 75, at 127. Interestingly,
Kovatch, the trial judge in Edmondson, acted as one of the defense counsel in this trial.
133. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, at ¶ 114 (noting Judge Kovatch’s “account of the personal
circumstances” of the defendant, as paraphrased by the Court of Appeal).
134. Id. at ¶ 20 (quoting sentencing report).
135. Bonokoski, supra note 109, at ¶ 46.
136. [2006] A.J. No. 1040 (Alta. C.A. Aug. 23, 2006).
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that not only applies the affirmative consent standard, but also
considerably elevates the requirements of masculine sexual
responsibility. What is it that allows for the violation of this risky
woman to be recognized in law?
In Ashlee, the complainant was observed lying unconscious on an
inner city sidewalk with two men fondling her breasts. 137 A witness
called the police and when they arrived five minutes later, they found the
woman in the same position, her breasts exposed, and each of the men
with a hand on one of her breasts. 138 She was taken to the hospital and
was still unconscious thirty minutes after she arrived. 139 The trial judge
found the defendants guilty on the basis that the complainant was
unconscious and, therefore, incapable of consenting. 140 On summary
The deciding judge
appeal, the convictions were reversed. 141
determined that the possibility of “prior consent” raised sufficient
reasonable doubt: “. . . there is absolutely nothing to suggest that she did
not consent to the activity at a time when she was still conscious and
capable of giving her consent.” 142
At issue in the Court of Appeal was the validity of the defense of
prior consent in a situation where a complainant is unconscious. 143 In a
stunning decision that will be widely cited in future case law, the Court
drew upon and elaborated the Ewanchuk standards, unequivocally
affirming that consent must be ongoing and active at the time of sexual
contact. 144 This decision stands as a firm rejection of the defense of
prior consent and one of the first clear appellate court rulings defining
unconsciousness as incapacity. 145 As the majority stated, “[c]onsent to
sexual activity does not remain operative after the person consenting
becomes unconscious. Consent is an ongoing state of mind, and
therefore ends as soon as the complainant falls unconscious and is
incapable of consenting. Prior consent is therefore ineffective at
law. . . .” 146 In this unambiguous equation of unconsciousness and
incapacity, Ashlee consolidates the affirmative and specific consent

137. Id. at ¶ 3.
138. Id. at ¶ 4.
139. Id.
140. Id. at ¶ 2.
141. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, at ¶ 2.
142. R. v. Ashlee, [2005] A.J. No. 1952, ¶ 16 (ABQB June 9, 2005).
143. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, at ¶ 2.
144. Id. at ¶ 25.
145. CC § 273.1(2)(b) states that “no consent is obtained, for the purposes of [this section],
where the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity.”
146. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, at ¶ 27.
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standard and elevates the requirements of responsibilized masculine
sexual subjectivity. By recognizing that consent is impossible without
consciousness, it alters the calculus of risk in a transactional sexual
economy. The responsibilized masculine subject must actively seek
consent and must accept that women who become unconscious lack the
rational capacity to consent. As the Court states, “[u]nconsciousness is
the antithesis of an operating state of mind.” 147
The unconscious complainant in Ashlee is thus constituted as being
inside, rather than external to a normative community of rational and
responsibilized sexual subjects.
She is distinguished from the
complainants in M.S. and Ashlee, who, as I have argued, are “Othered”
and relegated to a space outside of this responsibilized community. In
M.S., the complainant’s status as a homeless woman, an addict, the
occupant of a degenerate space, makes it possible for the deciding judge
to imagine that she consented to violent sex in a park in a plot to obtain a
jacket. 148 In Edmondson, the child complainant, intoxicated to the point
of passing out and falling down, was depicted as initiating sex with three
adult men on the hood of a truck. 149 In fact, she was defined as the
“sexual aggressor.” Yet in Ashlee, the complainant appears to escape
the disqualifications experienced by the complainants in M.S. and
Edmondson and what happened to her is understood as violating and
exceeding the normative standards of contractual consent. 150 In this
important decision, the majority explicitly measures her experience
against a “reasonableness” standard, arguing that, “[i]t is highly unlikely,
bordering on absurd, that a woman would consent, in anticipation of her
impending unconsciousness, to two men exposing and fondling her
breast on a public street in broad daylight in downtown Edmonton.” 151
In this way, the complainant in Ashlee becomes aligned with the
“reasonable woman” and her violation is legally recognized.
What allows for the complainant in Ashlee to be recognized in law
as a “victim,” when her risky sisters are relegated to a space of
“exception” and defined as “risks” to the normative masculine subject?
The complainant in Ashlee can be recognized as a “victim” only because
she has disappeared. The decision in Ashlee is extraordinary because the
defendants are convicted and these convictions are upheld on appeal
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without testimony from the complainant. 152 In fact, the complainant did
not even make a police statement. 153 There was, therefore, no
opportunity to attack her credibility. The complainant could not be
constructed as being responsible for her own victimization because she
was rendered an object. She becomes reduced to a legal hypothetical. It
is this hypothetical state that allows for her to be imagined in relation to
a community of responsible sexual subjects. It is this that allows the
Court of Appeal to draw analogies between her violation and the
violation of other women. What Ashlee suggests, especially when read
together with M.S. and Edmondson, is that extremely vulnerable women
may have the best chance of having their sexual violation recognized in
law when they simply disappear.
VI. CONCLUSION
Canadian socio-legal scholars deploying governmentality theory
have drawn attention to how law, in and through such practices as the
enforcement of punitive welfare regimes, actively produces distinctions
between good neoliberal subjects and “non-citizens,” pathologized by
their “refusal” to bear responsibility for their own lives. 154 As I have
argued here, the judicial elaboration of affirmative consent standards,
when read as a technology of neoliberal governmentality, enacts similar
distinctions. As judges move towards the embrace of a communicative
model of consent, the individualizing frame of criminal law is reinforced
and sexual subjects are responsibilized. Through responsibilization,
criminal law engages in a “governmental” project, exercising power as
much though normalization and the “conduct of conduct” as through
coercion and punishment. Within recent judicial discourses, normative
sexual interaction is reconstructed as being like an economic transaction,
and privileged actors within a sexual marketplace display behaviors that
mimic the market citizen of neo-liberalism. Motivated by a calculus of
risk, responsibilized masculine sexual subjects are redefined as active
consent-seekers, while normative feminine sexual subjects are
constituted as individualized agents of sexual assault prevention,
diligently self-policing their behaviors to avoid sexual dangers.
We must be attentive to how this reformulation of normative sexual
subjects enacts new patterns of exclusion and disqualification. When the
idealized rape victim is no longer defined by sexual propriety but by
152. Id. at ¶ 51.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Mosher, supra note 80.
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prudence, the defining characteristics of the unworthy complainant must
also be rethought. As I have suggested, women who defy the
responsibilized standards of feminine safe-keeping are constituted as
outside of the transactional logics of affirmative consent. While
mechanisms of disqualifying “risky women” in law continue to draw
upon sexualized and racialized constructions, I have drawn attention to
how these constructions are reframed in and through discourses of
responsibility and risk. The legal discourse of affirmative consent enacts
a separation between discrete events and the power relations
constructing vulnerabilities. The latter are silenced, and the constraints
on action that arise in situations of social marginalization are erased. In
this manner, sexual assault is individualized, depoliticized, and
reconstructed as a failure of responsibilization, while the power relations
that define sexual violence are obscured. Vulnerability is reconstructed
as a failure of responsibility and women who occupy spaces of risk
become reframed as sexual threats, thereby legitimizing and normalizing
deviations from responsibilized masculine sexual subjectivity. As
Stanko has written, “[w]omen who do not follow the rules for prudent
behaviour, it is presumed, deserve to be excluded from any benefits of
public provision of safety. . . .” 155 Risky women both fall through the
cracks of affirmative consent and ground the new negative pole of the
good victim/bad complainant dichotomy.

155. Stanko, supra note 52, at 486.
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